Antimicrobial Footprints, Fairness, and Collective Harm

This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by themselves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful

Multiple carbon accounting to support just and effective climate policies

Negotiating reductions in greenhouse gas emission involves the allocation of emissions and of emission reductions to specific agents, and notably, within the current UN framework, to associated countries. As production takes place in supply chains,increasingly extending over several countries, there are various options available in which emissions originating from one and the same activity may be attributed to different agents along the supply chain and thus to different countries. In this way, several distinct types of national carbon accounts can be constructed. We argue that these accounts will typically differ in the information they provide to individual countries on the effects their actions have on global emissions; and they may also, to varying degrees, prove useful in supporting the pursuit of an effective and just climate policy. None of the accounting systems, however, prove 'best' in achieving these aims under real-world circumstances; we thus suggest compiling reliable data to aid in the consistent calculation of multiple carbon accounts on a global level

Caffeine as a tool for investigating the integration of Cdc25 phosphorylation, activity and ubiquitin-dependent degradation in Schizosaccharomyces pombe

The evolutionarily conserved Cdc25 phosphatase is an essential protein that removes inhibitory phosphorylation moieties on the mitotic regulator Cdc2. Together with the Wee1 kinase, a negative regulator of Cdc2 activity, Cdc25 is thus a central regulator of cell cycle progression in Schizosaccharomyces pombe. The expression and activity of Cdc25 is dependent on the activity of the Target of Rapamycin Complex 1 (TORC1). TORC1 inhibition leads to the activation of Cdc25 and repression of Wee1, leading to advanced entry into mitosis. Withdrawal of nitrogen leads to rapid Cdc25 degradation via the ubiquitin- dependent degradation pathway by the Pub1 E3- ligase. Caffeine is believed to mediate the override of DNA damage checkpoint signalling, by inhibiting the activity of the ataxia telangiectasia mutated (ATM)/Rad3 homologues. This model remains controversial, as TORC1 appears to be the preferred target of caffeine in vivo. Recent studies suggest that caffeine induces DNA damage checkpoint override by inducing the nuclear accumulation of Cdc25 in S. pombe. Caffeine may thus modulate Cdc25 activity and stability via inhibition of TORC1. A clearer understanding of the mechanisms by which caffeine stabilises Cdc25, may provide novel insights into how TORC1 and DNA damage signalling is integrated

Vegetarian eating

The philosophical literature may seem to be replete with arguments for vegetarianism based on harm to animals. However, these arguments turn out to be arguments for veganism, not vegetarianism. This chapter explores whether anything can be said for vegetarianism. Some reasons motivating vegetarianism seem to be very personal, and so not the sorts of things that could be the foundation of a moral argument. Meanwhile, though they may hold some weight, arguments about vegetarianism as a “middle way” between veganism and omnivorism are highly contingent. Both of these routes, then, may seem unsatisfying to the vegetarian. Could there be a principled case for vegetarianism? Tzachi Zamir is the one philosopher who has argued at length for vegetarianism over veganism, but a close examination of his arguments show that they are not as compelling as they first seem. A final option remains open: there may be potential for arguments critiquing the eating of animals’ flesh and/or their bodies that are independent of concerns about harms to animals in food production. Such arguments, which have been hinted at in animal ethics, offer a critique of meat consumption, but not, necessarily, of egg and dairy consumption. Perhaps, then, they could form the basis of a principled case for vegetarianism that does not immediately become a case for veganism. The consequences of such an argument, if one can be made, are not simple